Humans and animals show cooperative behaviour, but our understanding of cooperation among unrelated laboratory animals is limited. A classic test of cooperation is the iterated Prisoner's Dilemma (IPD) game, where two players receive varying payoffs for cooperation or defection in repeated trials. To determine whether unrelated rats cooperate in the IPD, we tested pairs of rats making operant responses to earn food reward in 25 trials/day. The operant chamber was bisected by a metal screen with a retractable lever and pellet dispenser on each side. When levers extended, rats had 2 s to respond. Mutual cooperation (Reward) delivered three pellets each, mutual defection (Punishment) provided no pellets, and unilateral defection (Temptation) gave five pellets to the defector, while the partner (Sucker) received none. In eight pairs of males (RMÀ) and females (RFÀ), cooperation was defined by withholding a response. In seven pairs of RMþ males, cooperation was defined by responding on the lever. In males, food restriction significantly inhibited both cooperation and pellets received. There was no effect of dominance status. Males and females made similar numbers of responses under ad libitum feeding. However, neither food restriction nor dominance status affected responses in females. Rats were subsequently tested for reciprocity in 24 alternating trials/day. A response on the lever within 5 s delivered three pellets to the partner. Females made significantly more responses for their cage-mate than males. Responses within pairs were significantly correlated for males, but not for females. For both sexes, responses declined significantly when paired with an unfamiliar partner who never reciprocated ('bad stooge'). These results demonstrate that rats working for food show cooperation in IPD and direct reciprocity. Their responses depend on food availability and responses of their partner.
There is a long history of efforts to understand cooperative behaviour, because cooperation is an important dimension of social interactions in humans and animals. Cooperation can be understood from an economic perspective, where benefits to participants are measured in terms of resources gained or evolutionary fitness (see Schuster & Perelberg, 2004) . Cooperation can also involve cognitive and emotional elements, including responses to risk and reward (Rilling, 2011) . To explore neural mechanisms underlying cooperative behaviour in laboratory animals, new experimental models must be developed. Studies in laboratory animals have already elaborated brain circuits and signals that shape decision making under conditions of uncertainty, punishment and delay (Floresco, St Onge, Ghods-Sharifi, Winstanley, 2008) . Although laboratory animal tests of decision making do not typically incorporate social interactions, social decision making is an important component of cooperative behaviour. In particular, individual participants can increase their benefit or reduce their risks by 'gaming' the system. Thus, game theory has been used to model interactions among participants (humans, animals, organizations, governments) in potential cooperative interactions (Axelrod, 2006 ). The present study tested cooperation in pairs of unrelated rats in an operant model of the iterated Prisoner's Dilemma (IPD) game and in a test of direct reciprocity.
Kin selection and reciprocal altruism have been proposed to explain how cooperation develops (see Ale, Brown, & Sullivan, 2013) . Kinship can promote cooperation when the benefit to the recipient increases the evolutionary fitness of the donor (Hamilton, 1964) . Reciprocal altruism can promote cooperation when longterm benefits accrue to partners interacting repeatedly (Trivers, 1971) . Field studies describe the flexible interplay of multiple partners working for rewards and punishments among social animals living in complex environments. However, the sheer complexity of such interactions makes it difficult to resolve the relative roles of kin selection and reciprocal altruism in understanding cooperative behaviour (Raihani & Bshary, 2011) .
